Wednesday, January 8, 2014

Gopnik on the Roma

Be sure to read Adam Gopnik's excellent article on the Roma in The New Yorker.

Leftists Who Support Dieudonné

An interesting reportage in Le Monde. I won't attempt to psychoanalyze the remarks of these young fans of Dieudonné who describe themselves variously as left republicans, pro-free speech, anti-communitarian, etc. Some of them echo remarks made by commenters on this blog. Clearly they are not impressed by the argument that Dieudonné is a dangerous bigot, and just as clearly the repression of the comedian's performances promised by Manuel Valls will not put an end to the critique of the status quo offered by his fans. It will only conceal their complaints, which to my mind is more dangerous than airing them. To the extent that one of the chief complaints of the Dieudonné cult is the (I believe false) allegation that their views have been suppressed (rather than refuted as they deserve to be), the best response is to air them fully. I think Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had it right: "The mind of a bigot is like the pupil of the eye. The more light you shine on it, the more it will contract."

A Progressive Labor Market or a Partnership in Doom?

Bernadette Ségol among others questions the concept of "structural rigidities" in European labor markets:
A closer look at the plentiful literature claiming that structural unemployment (in economic terms: the NAIRU or non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) is caused by ‘rigid’ labour market institutions reveals that the evidence is pretty weak, or even non-existent.
Indeed, in 2005 a group of economists undertook a critical analysis of the economic literature on flexible labour markets, examining all the major mainstream studies since the beginning of the nineties (Howell 2005). Their conclusion was that there were many problems with the studies under review. In particular, econometric regressions were found to be ‘non-robust’. This means that, using the same data, modest changes in the measurements of institutions, countries or the time period covered led to zero, statistically insignificant or even changed coefficients. In the case of one paper that was very influential in opening this discussion on structural unemployment and labour market institutions, results could not be replicated when using the same specification but with a data set that had been improved by the author himself (a bit similar to the recent Reinhard/Rogoff incident concerning their paper on the 90% of GDP public debt threshold). Another conclusion was that, whereas the link between unemployment and factors such as job protection, unemployment benefits and trade union density was highly questionable, positive or regulatory practices such as coordinated collective bargaining and active labour market policies were scoring much better in explaining different outcomes in unemployment.
I agree that the prescribed medicine of more flexible labor markets will not cure Europe's--and more particularly France's--economic problems. In the French case, however, I think the problem is more subtle than a simple market-oriented analysis suggests. It is not an economic problem but a political-economic problem. Labor's understandable attachment to job protections and management's understandable aversion to production disruptions both reinforce government's devotion to political stability. The upshot is universal timidity: management is reluctant to take risks necessary to maintain competitiveness if the consequent reorganization of production is likely to alarm labor even temporarily; labor, distrustful of management's motives, is unwilling to tolerate any change in the production regime; and government is only too eager to subsidize compromise that keeps both labor and management quiescent in the short run, even if the short-term compromise threatens long-term viability. The result is a vicious circle of non-adaptive behavior. The illusion of stability is purchased at the very steep price of ultimate extinction.

French is fond of the phrase partenaires sociaux, the meaning of which is scarcely captured by the English "social partners." What I'm describing is a "partnership in doom," cemented by the intrinsic conservatism of French industrial relations--a conservatism masked by the occasional eruptions of "bossnapping" (as we see at the moment in Amiens) and industrial sabotage. At bottom, both management and labor abhor change and prefer the status quo even if the status quo spells doom in the face of accelerating global transformation. For too long government has abetted this conservatism of the social partners, but now that the unsustainability of the existing industrial relations regime is daily more apparent, government is beginning to panic, while populists are pushing the aversion to change into the phantasmagoric realm of nationalist retreat and complete withdrawal from global competition.